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ARKANSAS'S NEW MOTOR VEHICLE QUALITY
ASSURANCE ACT-A BRANCH OF HOPE FOR LEMON OWNERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to the 1993 session of the Arkansas General Assembly,
forty-eight states had "lemon laws" available as remedial assistance
to consumers who had purchased defective new automobiles,' but
Arkansas was not among them. 2 The Arkansas legislature had ex-
amined the issue previously,3 but due to the complexity of the subject,
instead of passing legislation, the 78th General Assembly decided to
defer the issue to allow further study by the Joint Interim Committee
on Public Transportation.4 Because lemon laws foster the protection
of consumer rights, Attorney General Winston Bryant directed his
Consumer Protection Division to do an in-depth study and to draft
a proposed lemon law for presentation to the Interim Committee.
The Committee held several hearings on the issue in which it reviewed
the draft prepared by the Attorney General's staff. On January 6,
1993, after inclusion of a few amendments of its own,5 the Committee
1. Rachel O'Neal, Lawmakers Draft Auto 'Lemon Law' Like 48 States Have,
ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Sept. 24, 1992, at lB.
2. Arkansas and South Dakota were the only two states without lemon laws.
Id. South Dakota subsequently enacted S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 32-6D-1 to
-11 (Supp. 1993) on March 13, 1993 as its version of a lemon law.
3. H.R. 1467, 78th Ark. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1991).
4. Interim Study 91-60. Issues sent to an interim committee for study are
generally those issues that fail to achieve support from a consensus of legislators
during the regular session. Rather than being subject to a "do not pass" vote or
when further study is desired, sponsors will move that their bill be sent to interim
study. Depending on the extent of interest in the issue, the issue may or may not
actually be considered by a particular committee between regular sessions. If high
interest is maintained, the interim committee will hold hearings to fully develop
the positions of various parties. Often, entirely new draft legislation will exit the
interim committee rather than the bill referred. However, the referred bill is generally
the catalyst for further development of the issue.
5. Most of the recommendations of the Committee were incorporated into
revised drafts prepared by the staff of the Attorney General for consideration at
subsequent hearings. These recommendations were largely of a technical nature as
suggested by interested parties. For example, the provision allowing the informal
dispute procedure to use only one person to decide a dispute unless the consumer
requests three members was incorporated at the request of representatives for one
of the informal dispute resolution programs. The result was basically a compromise
between that program's process of using only one decision maker and the Attorney
General's belief that three decision makers would be more likely to issue fair and
accurate decisions. However, some amendments by the Committee were of a more
substantive nature. See infra note 67.
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adopted the draft legislation prepared by the Attorney General's
staff.
6
The Committee version of the lemon law proceeded smoothly
through the legislative process. Two identical bills were introduced,
a Senate version 7 and a House version. 8 Both bills passed unani-
mously, were signed into law by Governor Jim Guy Tucker on
March 1, 1993, 9 and became effective on August 13, 1993.10
II. CLIMATE PRIOR TO THE NEW LEMON LAW
Prior to the enactment of the lemon law in Arkansas, the only
kinds of remedial relief available to consumers were the statutory
remedies of revocation of acceptance" and breach of warranty 12
under the Uniform Commercial Code. 3 Federal remedies also existed
through the Magnuson-Moss Federal Warranty Act. 4 However, as
shown below, these state and federal remedies failed to adequately
6. STAFF OF JOINT INTERIM COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION OF THE
78TH ARKANSAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MINUTES OF MEETING, (Jan. 6, 1993).
7. S. 169, 79th Ark. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1993) sponsored by Sen. Cliff
Hoofman and the Senate Committee on Public Transportation.
8. H.R. 1233, 79th Ark. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1993) sponsored by the
House Committee on Public Transportation and spearheaded by Rep. Myra Jones.
9. 1993 Ark. Acts 285 (Senate Bill), 297 (House Bill). Both Acts read identically
to each other. It is not uncommon for popular issues to originate in both chambers
of the legislature and for each chamber's bill to be enacted into law.
10. The effective date of legislation without an emergency clause is ninety days
after sine die, the official adjournment date of the legislative session. Fulkerson
v. Refunding Bd., 201 Ark. 957, 962, 147 S.W.2d 980, 983 (1940) (applying ARK.
CONST. amend. 7).
11. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-608 (Michie 1991). The buyer's rights upon revocation
of acceptance are the same as if he had rejected the goods in the first place. Id.
Generally, the buyer can return the goods and receive a return of the purchase
price. Id. § 4-2-711(1).
12. Id. § 4-2-714. Generally, the remedy for breach of warranty is compensation
for the difference between the value of the accepted goods at the time and place
of acceptance and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted.
Id.; see also Smart Chevrolet Co. v. Davis, 262 Ark. 500, 502, 558 S.W.2d 147,
148 (1977) (case remanded for proper determination of damages); Walker Ford
Sales v. Gaither, 265 Ark. 275, 280, 578 S.W.2d 23, 26 (1979) (remanded for
determination of vehicle's market value in defective condition). Incidental and
consequential damages may also be recovered in proper cases. Hanna Lumber Co.
v. Neff, 265 Ark. 462, 467, 579 S.W.2d 95, 98 (1979).
13. In 1993, the Arkansas Legislature enacted Chapter 2A to Title 4 of the
Arkansas Code, which provides similar revocation of acceptance and breach of
warranty remedies for consumer lease transactions. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-2A-
517, -210, -519 (Michie Supp. 1993). While the new Arkansas lemon law also covers
lease transactions, due to the similarity of UCC lease remedies to the remedies
applicable to sales of goods, no further analysis of the UCC lease provisions will
be undertaken in this article.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988).
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protect the interests of the consumer in the typical "lemon" vehicle
claim. A brief analysis of these remedies will be helpful in under-
standing the new lemon law.' 5
III. STATE LAW UCC REMEDIES
A. Revocation of Acceptance
The traditional UCC remedies include revocation of acceptance'
6
and breach of warranty actions. 7 In the typical revocation of
acceptance scenario, the consumer has purchased an item that suffers
some nonconformity" that substantially impairs its value. To illustrate,
suppose Mary wishes to purchase a dining table from her local
furniture retailer. She selects the style desired and accepts the delivery
by the retailer. Only when she removes the protective shipping
covering does she discover that the table has a large scratch in the
finish. Mary does not want this table, and, therefore, she contacts
the retailer and revokes her acceptance of the table.
Similarly, Mary purchases a new automobile. She has no means
of knowing the internal condition of the engine. Believing that the
automobile is in good condition, she accepts the vehicle and attempts
to drive home. Only after being stranded along the side of the
highway, due to the failure of a defective internal engine component,
does she realize that her new car contains a nonconformity that
justifies her refusal to accept the car as her purchase. Mary then
revokes her acceptance due to the nonconformity that substantially
impairs the value of the car. While these examples are simplistic,
they aptly illustrate the basics of a transaction subject to revocation
of acceptance.
There are two types of acceptance that are subject to revocation.19
One type is that described in the preceding example where acceptance
15. The lemon law provides a statutory merger of certain aspects of UCC
remedies and Magnuson-Moss.
16. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-608 (Michie 1991). For an excellent discussion on
revocation of acceptance, see Vicki D. Rau, New Remedies for Defective Automobile
Purchasers: A Proposal for a Model Lemon Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 145 (1988).
17. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-714 (Michie 1991).
18. Nonconformities are defined to include "not only breaches of warranties
but also any failure of the seller to perform according to his obligations under
the contract." Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117, 1122 (8th Cir.
1982) (quoting ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-714, cmt 2 (1947)).
19. The court in Ford Motor Credit, 671 F.2d at 1122, interpreted Arkansas
law as providing four criteria which justify revocation of acceptance. The buyer
1994]
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was reasonably induced by the difficulty of discovery of a
nonconformity before acceptance. 20 The other type of acceptance
subject to revocation is the situation in which acceptance was based
on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be cured
and that cure has not seasonably occurred.
2'
In either case, the buyer is required to give notice to the seller
of his revocation, 22 and the issue of the reasonableness of the notice
as to form and substance is a question of fact. 23 Further, the questions
of whether the goods were nonconforming and whether a revocation
of acceptance was given within a reasonable time are also questions
of fact.
24
Generally, the remedy for revocation of acceptance 25 is to make
the buyer whole as of the date of the sale. 26 In order to revoke his
acceptance, the buyer is not required to tender the goods at the
must establish:
(1) a nonconformity which substantially impairs the value of the goods
to the buyer;
(2) [that] acceptance [occurred:]
(a) with discovery of the defect, [but] on the reasonable assumption
that the nonconformity would be cured, or
(b) without discovery [when the failure to discover was] reasonably
induced by the difficulty of the discovery or by seller's assurances;
(3) [that] revocation [occurred] within a reasonable time after the non-
conformity was discovered or should have been discovered; and
(4) [that] revocation [occurred] before a substantial change [occurred]
in the condition of the goods not caused by their own defects.
Id. (quoting approvingly from JAMES J. WroTE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, § 8-3, at 303 (2d ed. 1980)).
20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-608(l)(b) (Michie 1991).
21. Id. § 4-2-608(1)(a). An example of this would be where a seller promises
to repair a knocking sound in the engine of a car if the consumer will buy the
automobile.
23. Rogers Excavating, Inc. v. R.A. Young & Son, Inc., 3 Ark. App. 297,
299, 625 S.W.2d 560, 562 (1981).
24. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117, 1124 (8th Cir. 1982);
May v. J.T.L., Inc., 292 Ark. 274, 278, 729 S.W.2d 417, 419 (1987); Ozark
Kenworth, Inc. v. Neidecker, 283 Ark. 196, 200, 672 S.W.2d 899, 902 (1984);
Frontier Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Trigleth, 256 Ark. 101, 103-04, 505 S.W.2d
516, 517 (1974); Dopieralla v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 255 Ark. 150, 152,
499 S.W.2d 610, 611 (1973); Gramling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 352, 358, 485 S.W.2d
183, 188 (1972); O'Neal Ford, Inc. v. Early, 13 Ark. App. 189, 192, 681 S.W.2d
414, 416 (1985); McFall Chevrolet Co. v. Collin, 271 Ark. 469, 471, 609 S.W.2d
118, 120 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
25. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-608(3) (Michie 1991).
26. Frontier Mobile Home, 256 Ark. at 106, 505 S.W.2d at 518. However, in
proper circumstances, punitive damages may be awarded if the tort of deceit is
proven as part of the case. Wheeler Motor Co. v. Roth, 315 Ark. 318, 327, 867
S.W.2d 446, 450 (1993).
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time of revocation, 27 but may instead retain the goods until reimbursed
by the seller. 2 However, when the buyer does receive reimbursement, 29
the goods must be returned to the seller.30 Even when the seller has
disclaimed all warranties, revocation of acceptance is still available.'
It should be understood that a buyer can only revoke his acceptance
if the defects existed at the time of purchase.3 2 For this reason,
revocation of acceptance is generally not a sufficient remedy to an
owner of a lemon vehicle when the problems arise after purchase.
B. Breach of Warranty Under U.C.C.
In any action by a consumer to recover for breach of an express
warranty,33 clearly there must be an actual breach of the terms of
the warranty. However, automobile warranties generally only provide
coverage to "repair" defects that arise.34 Thus, as long as the
27. Snow v. C.I.T. Corp., 278 Ark. 554, 558, 647 S.W.2d 465, 467 (1983).
28. Id.
29. The seller may be entitled to a reasonable offset for use of the goods, but
the burden will be on the seller to establish a reasonable basis for determining a
setoff. In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117, 1125 n.10 (8th Cir.
1982) (quoting WHrrn & SUMMERS, supra note 19, § 8-3).
The court stated:
[In the typical revocation of acceptance case] the goods are defective;
they fail in some way to perform the function for which the buyer purchased
them and if they confer a benefit at all it is a lesser benefit than the
buyer expected to receive. Moreover, the buyer can argue that he received
not only a smaller benefit than he expected, but he also suffered the
psychic cost associated with the uncertainty about whether the goods would
work and the aggravation associated with unsuccessful attempts to cure.
In a typical contract suit we would not allow the buyer to recover for
such psychic injuries but it is not clear that they should not be worked
into the valuation scheme in this kind of case. In any event the principle
is the same, namely that the buyer should pay for the benefit conferred;
the difficulty arises only in valuing that benefit. Presumably, if the breach-
ing party (the seller) is the "bad guy" the court should not be generous
to him but should leave to him the burden of coming forward with credible
evidence to show that he is entitled to an offset by proving the value of
the benefit conferred on the buyer.
Id.
30. Microsize, Inc. v. Arkansas Microfilm, Inc., 29 Ark. App. 49, 53, 780
S.W.2d 574, 577 (1989).
31. Ford Motor Credit, 671 F.2d at 1122 n.7 (8th Cir. 1982); O'Neal Ford,
Inc. v. Early, 13 Ark. App. 189, 192-93, 681 S.W.2d 414, 416 (1985).
32. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-608 (Michie 1991).
33. Id. § 4-2-313.
34. For example, Toyota's 1994 Owner's Guide provides, "This warranty covers
repairs to any part that Toyota supplies that is defective in materials or workmanship
under normal use." The warranty guide provided with 1993 Cadillacs provides,
"This warranty covers repairs to correct any vehicle defect related to materials or
workmanship occurring during the WARRANTY PERIOD." Other manufacturer's
warranties are similar to these statements.
1994] 497
UALR LAW JOURNAL
manufacturer is making reasonable attempts to repair a defect, there
is little likelihood of any successful recourse based upon breach of
warranty. Likewise, if the defects consist of numerous different
malfunctions, as long as reasonable attempts to repair the problems
are undertaken, generally no action will lie since the terms of the
warranties only require repair."
Other avenues under breach of warranty are based upon an
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose3 6 and an implied
warranty of merchantability.17 However, the seller most often, if not
always, disclaims any express or implied warranties,38 and the
manufacturer likewise either disclaims or limits its liability.39 When
35. Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176, 185, 465 S.W.2d 80, 85 (1971)
(finding liability not limited to repairs by terms of warranty, the court stated that
if Ford Motor Company intended the repair remedy to be exclusive, it should have
stated so in express language); see also, Koperski v. Husker Dodge, Inc., 302
N.W.2d 655, 664 (Neb. 1981) (stating that .'[rlepair and replacement' clauses, in
the nature of those contained in Chrysler's limited warranty, have become the basic
mechanism by which manufacturers limit or avoid liability in actions for breach
of warranty.").
36. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-315 (Michie 1991). Unless excluded or modified,
an implied warranty that the goods are fit for a particular purpose exists where
the seller has reason to know at the time of sale a particular purpose for which
the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment
to select or furnish goods. Id.
37. Id. § 4-2-314. Unless excluded or modified, a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind. To be merchantable, goods must be at least
fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. Other criteria for
merchantability are that goods: (1) must pass, without objection, in the trade as
described in the contract; (2) when the goods are fungible, be of fair average
quality according to the contract description; (3) be, within variations permitted
by the contract, of equal kind, quality, and quantity between each and among all
units; (4) be adequately contained, packaged, and labeled pursuant to the contract;
and (5) meet the promises or affiriiiations of fact made on any Iabc.1 or container.
Id.
38. Id. § 4-2-316. This section provides that, unless the circumstances indicate
otherwise, all implied warranties may be excluded by expressions such as "as is,"
"with all faults," or "other language which in common understanding calls the
buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty." Id.
39. General Motors, in their 1993 warranty provisions, provide for the following
limitations which are typical among other manufacturers:
General Motors does not authorize any person to create for it any other
obligation or liability in connection with these vehicles. ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PAR-
TICULAR PURPOSE APPLICABLE TO THIS VEHICLE IS LIMITED
IN DURATION TO THE DURATION OF THIS WRITTEN WAR-
RANTY. PERFORMANCE OF REPAIRS AND NEEDED ADJUST-
MENTS IS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY UNDER THIS WRITTEN
WARRANTY OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY. GENERAL MOTORS
[Vol. 16:495
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the limitations on the implied warranties are structured such that
repairs or adjustments are the only obligation of the manufacturer,
the remedies for breach are the same as that for breach of an
express warranty: the consumer is entitled to the difference between
the value as warranted and the value as accepted.40 For a consumer
who has purchased a vehicle plagued with problems, the remedy of
difference in value is generally not sufficient.
4'
IV. FEDERAL REMEDIES-MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 42 (hereinafter "Magnuson-
Moss") was passed to make available to consumers 43 the complete
disclosure of coverage provided by a warranty" and °to create a
SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES (SUCH AS, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, LOST WAGES OR
VEHICLE RENTAL EXPENSES) RESULTING FROM BREACH OF
THIS WRITTEN WARRANTY OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY.*
*Some states do not allow limitations on how long an implied warranty
will last or the exclusion or limitation of incidental or consequential
damages, so the above limitations or exclusions may not apply to you.
Id.
40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-714(2) (Michie 1991); see also, Ford Motor Credit
Co. v. Harper, 671 F.2d 1117, 1121 (8th Cir. 1982) (defining the remedies available
for breach of warranty). For a good analysis of remedies, see Walker Ford Sales
v. Gaither, 265 Ark. 275, 578 S.W.2d 23 (1979).
41. Presumably, the consumer could have the automobile repaired at an in-
dependent facility, and after paying for the repairs at the independent facility,
attempt to recover from the warrantor. However, it would be practically impossible
to determine defects that may yet arise under the remaining period of warranty
coverage, and it would not be feasible to bring an action for breach of warranty
every time a repair must be made. Even more problematic, given the complexity
of technology in today's automobiles, it is often the fact that repairs can only be
accomplished by the manufacturer. To avoid these problems, the consumer either
desires a new automobile or his money refunded.
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988).
43. "Consumer" is defined as a buyer, "other than for purposes of resale"
of any consumer product. Consumer is also defined to include any other person
entitled by the terms of the warranty or applicable state law to enforce the warranty.
Id. § 2301(3). However, where a consumer product is used in a commercial business,
coverage under Magnuson-Moss might not be available. Compare Richards v.
General Motors Corp., 461 So. 2d 285 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (finding no error
in trial court's holding that pickup truck used to haul produce from farm to market
and which was deducted as a business expense on tax returns was not a consumer
good within the meaning of Magnuson-Moss); with Business Modeling Techniques,
Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 474 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1984) (holding that automobiles
used only in part for business purposes were consumer products within the meaning
of Magnuson-Moss).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a) (1988). This section lists some of the disclosures that
the Federal Trade Commission may impose to be included in a written warranty.
These include: (1) clear identification of the warrantor; (2) the product or parts
19941 499
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private action to enforce warranties on goods purchased.45 However,
the standards set forth in the act apply mostly to "full" warranties, 4
whereas warranties that do not meet the standards are to only be
labeled as "limited" warranties .47 Because automobile manufacturers
generally provide only a "limited" warranty on vehicles sold, there
are limited remedies under Magnuson-Moss. 48
For consumer products that are covered by a limited warranty,
the manufacturer occasionally requires a consumer to first proceed
through an informal dispute resolution procedure before commencing
a civil action based upon a warranty dispute. When such an informal
process requirement is incorporated in the terms of the written
warranty, the Magnuson-Moss informal dispute settlement provisions
will apply. 49 However, manufacturers of automobiles have carefully
worded their warranties regarding pre-litigation dispute resolution
procedures in order to avoid falling under this Magnuson-Moss
provision. 0
covered; (3) responsibilities of the consumer; (4) procedures for the consumer to
undertake when obtaining service under the warranty; (5) the availability and
requirement of proceeding through any informal dispute settlement procedure; and
(6) those authorized to perform service under the warranty. Id.
45. Id. § 2310(d).
46. Id. § 2303(a)(1). Written warranty that meets the federal minimum standards
for warranties set forth in section 2304 is to be conspicuously designated as "full
(statement of duration) warranty." Id.
47. Id. § 2303(a)(2). A warranty that does not meet the federal minimum
standards of § 2304 must be conspicuously designated a "limited warranty." Id.
48. A manufacturer who provides a warranty that does not meet the federal
minimum standards needs only to conspicuously designate it as a "limited warranty."
Id. § 2303(a)(2). Nothing in Magnuson-Moss authorizes the imposition of require-
ments for durations of written warranties or requirements that a consumer product
be warranted. Id. § 2302(b)(2).
49. d § 21 (a)(4). Magnuson-Mnos delegates tn the Federal Trade Conimi on
rule-making authority for minimum requirements of an informal dispute settlement
procedure. Id. § 2310(a)(2). The regulations address disclosure to consumers of the
existence of the procedure, organizations, qualifications of members, and operation
of the procedure. Criteria governing record-keeping and audits are also included.
16 C.F.R. §§ 703.1-.8 (1993).
50. A typical example of this wording is found in the 1993 General Motors
warranty manuals:
We encourage you to use this program before or instead of resorting to
the courts. We believe it offers advantages over courts in most jurisdictions
because it is fast, free of charge, and informal (lawyers are not usually
present, although you may retain one at your expense if you choose). If
you wish to go to court, however, we do not require that you first file
a claim with BBB AUTO LINE [BBB AUTO LINE provides informal
dispute settlement procedures for General MotorsJ unless state law provides
otherwise.** Whatever your preference may be, remember that if you are
unhappy with the results of BBB AUTO LINE, you can still go to court
[Vol. 16:493
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V. THE ARKANSAS NEW MOTOR VEHICLES QUALITY ASSURANCE
ACT (LEMON LAW)
Because of the difficulties in obtaining remedial relief through
these traditional remedies, all states have now enacted lemon laws
that attempt to provide the benefits of these remedies, while closing
some of the loopholes. The laws also attempt to better define the
vague terms which exist in warranty law. For example, the Arkansas
lemon law5' incorporates certain provisions of Magnuson-Moss as
further defined by the regulations promulgated thereunder;5 2 more-
over, the law further defines the reasonable number of attempts to
repair a nonconformity5 3 that might give rise to revocation of ac-




The Arkansas lemon law applies to vehicles "purchased or
leased" in Arkansas .5 There are no exclusions for vehicles purchased
for commercial use or by corporations; therefore, vehicles used
primarily for business are also covered by the Arkansas lemon law. 7
The law does not provide coverage, however, for mopeds, motorcycles,
the living facilities of motorhomes, or vehicles over 10,000 pounds
gross vehicle weight rating.58 In addition, enforcement is not limited
to the original purchaser or lessee but to any other person "entitled
by the terms of the warranty to enforce the obligations of the
warranty."5 9 Therefore, used vehicles that are still covered by the
because an arbitrator's decision is binding on GM but not on you, unless
you accept it.
**Some states may require that you file a claim with BBB AUTO LINE
before resorting to state-operated procedures (including court).
51. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-90-401 to -417 (Michie Supp. 1993).
52. 16 C.F.R. § 703.1-.8 (1993).
53. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-410 (Michie Supp. 1993).
54. Id. § 4-90-406(b)(1)(A)(ii). For example, acceptance type relief could include
refund of the purchase price. Id.
55. Id. § 4-90-402. Part of the legislative intent is to "provide the statutory
procedures whereby a consumer may receive a replacement motor vehicle, or a full
refund, for a motor vehicle which cannot be brought into conformity with the
warranty ..... " Id.
56. Id. § 4-90-403(11).
57. This expands the Magnuson-Moss remedy which only applies to "consumer"
products.
58. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-403(11) (Michie Supp. 1993). The 10,000 pound
weight exclusion does not apply to the chassis of motorhomes. Therefore, motor-
homes have coverage as to the basic chassis but not to any of the living facilities.
Id.
59. Id. § 4-90-403(4).
19941
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original manufacturer's warranty after being sold to subsequent
purchasers are also subject to continued lemon law coverage. 6
In order to fall under the Arkansas lemon law, a vehicle must
be covered under the manufacturer's original warranty. 6' This stems
from the fact that the lemon law is a warranty enforcement act,
not an act to create a warranty on a vehicle. Under the law, the
manufacturer, its agent, or authorized dealer is required to conform
a vehicle to the warranty. 62 Furthermore, the expiration of the
warranty does not release the manufacturer from its obligations to
make repairs to defects that came about during the coverage period
of the warranty.
63
When examining the time period available for lemon law relief,
the manufacturer's warranty period may in fact exceed64 the lemon
law's "motor vehicle quality assurance period. 61 5 This "assurance
period" begins on the date of original delivery of the vehicle to a
retail consumer and ends twenty-four months after delivery or 24,000
miles, whichever occurs last.66 It is defined more broadly than most
60. Id. An interesting but unresolved issue here could arise when a new or used
vehicle still under warranty is purchased outside of Arkansas but then brought into
Arkansas by the purchaser. Technically, the owner will meet the definition of
consumer under the lemon law; however, the vehicle will not precisely fit the
definition of "motor vehicle," because that term requires that the vehicle be
"purchased or leased in this state." Id. § 4-90-403(11). Nevertheless, this may not
create a problem when submitting a claim to the informal dispute resolution program,
because most of the operating procedures established by the programs for man-
ufacturers do not condition coverage on any basis that includes location of purchase.
If, however, the consumer desires to pursue court action, place of purchase might
become an issue.
Also, limiting coverage only to those vehicles purchased in Arkansas would
mean that a vehicle originally purchased new outside of Arkansas but subsequently
sold as a used vehicle in Arkansas would be subject to coverage. Likewise, an
UUL-UI-3L4L 1,.J11DUlll~ 110I JU1',II ;.11 I a VV;IlIVl InI P1-N4ll d. Wt.UU lII4VY IIII[U1[;
in Arkansas under the lemon law.
61. Id. § 4-90-403(17). This includes both express and implied warranties if not
disclaimed. Id. The legislative intent is to resolve good faith warranty complaints.
Id. at § 4-90-402. "Consumers" are defined to include those who are entitled to
enforce the terms of the warranty. Id. § 4-90-403(4).
62. Id. § 4-90-405.
63. Id.
64. For example, the vehicle may have a manufacturer's warranty that covers
seven years or seventy thousand miles, whichever expires first. But once the vehicle
has exceeded the lemon law's period of coverage of twenty-four months or twenty-
four thousand miles, whichever expires last, the vehicle will still have warranty
coverage, but not lemon law coverage.
65. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-403(12) (Michie Supp. 1993).
66. Id. A typical motor vehicle warranty coverage in 1994 is for thirty-six
months or 36,000 miles, whichever expires first. Therefore, once either of these
conditions, months or miles, is reached, the manufacturer's warranty expires. If
[Vol. 16:493
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time-mileage definitions such as the manufacturer's warranty. Under
the lemon law, both the time and the mileage must have expired
before losing coverage, 67 whereas under most time-mileage definitions,
coverage is lost when exceeding the first of time or mileage.
68
The lemon law became effective on August 13, 1993, and one
issue which is apparent is whether a vehicle purchased prior to the
effective date of the lemon law is covered by the law's provisions.
The Arkansas Attorney General's office has taken the position that
a vehicle purchased prior to the effective date of the law will be
covered if the vehicle is still under the manufacturer's original
warranty, the vehicle is within the lemon law's "quality assurance
period," and the defect giving rise to lemon status occurs after the
effective date.
69
B. Defects Giving Rise To "Lemon" Status
Under the lemon law, the manufacturer is required to conform
the motor vehicle to the terms of the warranty.70 After the
manufacturer has been given a reasonable number of attempts to
repair one or more nonconformities and these nonconformities
substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the vehicle, the
failure to repair gives rise to lemon law relief.7" Such relief allows
the vehicle has 34,000 miles on it, and it has been twenty-two months since original
delivery, then it will still be covered under the lemon law. It would still be within
the thirty-six months or 36,000 miles, whichever expires first, limitation of the
manufacturer's warranty, and it would still be within the twenty-four months or
24,000 miles, whichever expires last, limitation of the motor vehicle quality assurance
period of the lemon law, because the latter (twenty-four months) has not yet
expired. In conclusion, the vehicle must meet both the manufacturer's limitations
and the lemon law's limitations to be subject to lemon law coverage.
67. The use of 24 months or 24,000 miles, whichever expires later, was one of
the amendments adopted by the Joint Interim Committee on Public Transportation
to increase the coverage of the lemon law. STAFF OF JOINT INTERIM COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION OF THE 78TH ARKANSAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MINUTES OF
MEETING, (Jan. 6, 1993).
68. For example, a new motor vehicle warranty may provide coverage for thirty-
six months or thirty-six thousand miles, whichever expires first. When the vehicle
exceeds thirty-six thousand miles, despite the fact that the vehicle has been in
service for only twenty-four months, the warranty coverage will expire. Likewise,
when the vehicle has been in service for over thirty-six months, the warranty
coverage will expire even if the vehicle only has twenty thousand miles on it.
69. This conclusion is supported by Laiosa v. Camelot AMC/Jeep, Ltd., 495
N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (holding it permissible to apply lemon law
to vehicles purchased before the effective date of that law). But see 83 Op. Att'y
Gen. 7 (Nev. 1983).
70. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-406(a)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993).
71. Id. § 4-90-406(b).
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the consumer to either receive a replacement vehicle or to have the
manufacturer repurchase the vehicle. 72
When determining the definition of "nonconformity," it must
be noted that the term is necessarily broadly defined.3 Given the
complexity of today's automobiles, it would be virtually impossible
to provide a laundry list of problems that would warrant lemon law
relief. But, in addition to the requirement of a nonconformity, the
nonconformity must "substantially impair ' 74 the motor vehicle and
not be something of minor importance.
75
The next prerequisite for lemon law relief is that the manufacturer
must have been given a "reasonable number of attempts" to repair
the nonconformity or nonconformities.76 The lemon law provides a
standard by which a reasonable number of attempts to repair is
presumed to have occurred.7 7 The presumption is rebuttable78 and
arises when a vehicle has been subject to three prior opportunities
to repair the same nonconformity, but despite these opportunities,
the problem has not been cured.79 After the consumer gives notice,
via certified mail, to the manufacturer of the failure to cure, the
72. Id. § 4-90-406(b)(l)(A)(i), (ii).
73. Id. § 4-90-403(13). This section provides:
'Nonconformity' means any specific or generic defect or condition or any
concurrent combination of defects or conditions that:
(A) Substantially impairs the use, market value, or safety of a motor
vehicle; or
(B) Renders the motor vehicle nonconforming to the terms of an applicable
manufacturer's express warranty or implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity.
Id.
74. Id. § 4-90-406(b)(1)(A). What "substantially impairs" the use, value, or
safety of the vehicle most likely will be a question of fact. The New Jersey Supreme
Court, in determining what constitutes substantial impairment under that state's
lemon law, has held that an important factor is whether the nonconformity "shakes
the buyer's confidence" in the goods. Berrie v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
630 A.2d 1180, 1182 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993). There, the court found
the test not to be purely objective, but that it may be "personalized in the sense
that the facts must be examined from the viewpoint of the buyer and his circum-
stances, objective in the sense that the criterion is what a reasonable person in the
buyer['s] position would have believed." Id. (quoting G.M.A.C. v. Jankowski, 523
A.2d 695, 706 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)).
75. For example, a cigarette lighter which does not work should not be sufficient
for lemon law relief. If, however, a cigarette lighter caused electrical problems,
such as a risk of fire or the malfunctioning of other important electrical components,
that problem would be sufficient for lemon law relief.
76. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-406(b)(l)(A) (Michie Supp. 1993).
77. Id. § 4-90-410(a).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 4-90-406(a)(1).
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manufacturer is allowed one final attempt.8 0 If this final attempt to
repair is not successful, the presumption takes effect.
The presumption also arises when the vehicle has been subject
to one prior opportunity to repair a nonconformity that is likely to
cause death or serious bodily injury. 8' After notice by certified mail
to the manufacturer from the consumer that the defect exists and
has not been cured despite an opportunity to repair, the manufacturer
is given one last opportunity to cure the defect. Failure to cure on
this final attempt gives effect to the presumption.82
Two other situations give rise to the presumption that a reasonable
number of attempts to repair has occurred. First, if the vehicle has
been out of service for a cumulative total of thirty calendar days
during the motor vehicle quality assurance period, the presumption
is established.8 3 The thirty days may be extended for certain specified
reasons such as war, invasion, strike, fire, flood, or natural disaster,8
but the burden is on the manufacturer to show that the specified
reason was the direct cause for the failure to cure the nonconformity. 5
The last presumption arises when the vehicle has been subject
to five or more attempts, on separately occurring occasions, 86 to
repair any nonconformities that together substantially impair the use
and value of the motor vehicle. 87 The purpose of this section is to
award relief for vehicles that seem to be plagued with varying
problems. Typically, in this scenario, the individual problems are
cured when taken to the dealership, yet the vehicle continues to be
troubled with subsequent differing defects.
C. Remedies
When a vehicle has been determined to be a lemon under the
Arkansas New Motor Vehicle Quality Assurance Act, the consumer88
80. Id. § 4-90-410(a)(1) (referring back to § 4-90-406(a)). That referenced section
sets forth the actual number of attempts to repair that give rise to the presumptions.
81. Id. § 4-90-406(a)(1).
82. Id. § 4-90-406(b)(l)(A).
83. Id. § 4-90-410(a)(2). What is defined as constituting a day is not clear in
the statute. "Calendar day" is defined as "any day of the week other than a legal
holiday." Id. at § 4-90-403(1). Whether an "over-night" stay is required or whether
a partial day would satisfy the requirement is also unclear.
84. Id. § 4-90-410(b).
85. Id. § 4-90-410(c).
86. At the request of manufacturers, the legislature added the separately occurring
occasions provision to alleviate fears that a consumer may bring his automobile
in for repair of five different nonconformities that had occurred at the same time
and then be entitled to lemon law relief. This position is based upon the assumption
that, unlike numerous defects occurring over a span of time, simultaneous defects
generally do not burden consumers to a degree warranting lemon law relief.
87. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-410(a)(3) (Michie Supp. 1993).
88. The consumer may also include the lessee and lessor. In the case of a lease
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is entitled to either a replacement vehicle or a refund of the purchase
price, plus payment for all collateral89 and incidentaP° charges. 9'
However, the consumer will be responsible for a reasonable offset
for use.92 This offset is calculated by a formula set forth in the
lemon law where the life of the vehicle is pro-rated over 120,000
miles. 93 When calculating the mileage, however, the consumer is to
be assessed only for the mileage accumulated up to the time the
consumer first delivers the vehicle to the manufacturer, its agent,
or authorized dealer for correction of the nonconformity. 94 The
consumer will also be responsible for any physical damage the vehicle
has sustained while under the consumer's ownership. 95
The lemon law provides the consumer with an unconditional
right to choose a refund instead of a replacement vehicle.9 If the
manufacturer and the consumer agree to replace the vehicle, the
manufacturer that has financed the purchase of the vehicle, either
directly or through one of its subsidiaries or agents, cannot require
or impose upon the consumer a financial obligation greater than
the original financing agreement.Y In addition, the replacement vehicle
must be "identical or reasonably equivalent" to the vehicle being
replaced as the vehicle being replaced existed at the time of the
original acquisition.98 Accordingly, the replacement vehicle should
not be a used vehicle of like kind and quality but rather a new
vehicle, a formula is provided in the act for distribution of refund proceeds between
the lessee and the lessor. Id. § 4-90-407(2). In addition, the lease contract is to be
terminated without penalty to the consumer for early termination. Id. § 4-90-407(b).
89. Id. § 4-90-403(2). "Collateral charges" are those charges to a consumer
incurred as a result of the vehicle's acquisition which include, but are not limited
to, "manufacturer-installed or agent-installed items, earned finance charges, sales
taxes, title charges, and charges for extended warranties provided by the manu-
fatuer -U id-y, or agcnt. ... d
90. Id. § 4-90-403(5). "Incidental charges" are "those reasonable costs incurred
by the consumer, including, but not limited to, towing charges and the costs of
obtaining alternative transportation which are directly caused by the nonconformity
or nonconformities which are the subject of the claim, but shall not include loss
of use, loss of income, or personal injury claims ... ." Id.
91. Id. § 4-90-406(b)(l)(B).
92. Id. § 4-90-406(b)(l)(A)(ii).
93. Id. § 4-90-406(b)(3). For example, a consumer who has driven the vehicle
for 20,000 miles has utilized one-sixth of the vehicle's value, which is prorated
over 120,000 miles (20,000 - 120,000). If the purchase price of the vehicle was
$18,000, then one-sixth of $18,000 would be $3,000. The consumer would be charged
$3,000 as his reasonable offset for use.
94. Id.
95. Id. § 4-90-406(b)(1)(A)(ii).
96. Id. § 4-90-406(b)(2)(A).
97. Id. § 4-90-407(c).
98. Id. § 4-90-403(16).
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vehicle, with the consumer being charged a reasonable offset for
use and any applicable offset for physical damage. 99 Thus, after
receiving payment from the consumer for the offsets, the
manufacturer, its subsidiary, or agent, cannot require a higher financial
obligation either in payment amounts or total principal when replacing
the vehicle.
Whether a refund or a replacement is desired, the consumer
has a right to retain the vehicle for use until the refund or replacement
is tendered.'0° Since the formula for determining the amount to be
charged the consumer as an offset for use only calculates mileage
up to the point of first return for repairs of the specific nonconformity,
the consumer cannot be charged for use while awaiting tender of
the refund or replacement.' 0
D. Procedural Steps For Relief
The consumer generally has two different types of notification
that he must make when proceeding under the lemon law. First, in
giving the manufacturer a final attempt to repair a nonconformity
(after three attempts to repair, or one attempt if the nonconformity
is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury), the consumer must
give written notification, by certified or registered mail, to the
manufacturer of the need to repair the nonconformity.' °2 However,
no such notice is required when the reasonable number of attempts
to repair arises from the vehicle being thirty days or more out of
service or subject to five or more separately occurring
nonconformities.1b3
The second notice required of the consumer arises when making
a claim for relief under the lemon law. In order to recover under
99. Id. § 4-90-406(b)(1)(A)(i).
100. Id. § 4-90-409.
101. Id. § 4-90-406(b)(3). The retention of the vehicle while awaiting tender of
the refund or replacement is similar to the U.C.C. security interest retention available
under revocation of acceptance. See Snow v. C.I.T. Corp., 278 Ark. 554, 558,
647 S.W.2d 465, 467 (1983). However, whereas revocation of acceptance under the
U.C.C. results in the consumer being subject to charge for continued use after
revocation, the lemon law limits the usage charge only up to the point of the first
attempt to repair the vehicle. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-406(b)(3) (Michie Supp.
1993).
102. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-406(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1993).
103. When a presumption arises from failure to make required repairs, the notice
by the consumer for a final attempt to repair is required. Id. § 4-90-410(a)(1)
(making reference to § 4-90-406(a)). However, the presumptions arising from five
separately occurring nonconformities or thirty days out of service do not have any
requirement of a final attempt to repair. Id. § 4-90-419(a)(2), (3).
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the lemon law, the consumer is required to notify the manufacturer
of his claim.'04 However, if the manufacturer has not disclosed to
the consumer at the time of purchase or lease a statement of the
consumer's rights and obligations under the lemon law,' °5 then this
second notice requirement is waived.'06 Generally, this notification
will be no obstacle since most claims are required to first proceed
through the informal dispute resolution program, which is in an
agency relationship with the manufacturer. 7 The informal dispute
resolution program is required to give notice to the manufacturer
when a claim has been filed. 0 Therefore, the notice to the
manufacturer will be automatic in most cases.
Before being entitled to court-enforced remedies, it is important
to note that the consumer must first bring the claim through an
informal dispute resolution procedure '09 in which every manufacturer
of vehicles subject to the lemon law must operate or participate." '0
Notwithstanding this requirement of participation in an informal
dispute resolution program,"' the manufacturer may unilaterally waive
the prerequisite of a consumer first proceeding through the informal
process prior to going to court."12 When a consumer does proceed
through the informal process, he cannot be charged any costs for
utilization of the informal dispute resolution procedure." 3
104. Id. § 4-90-404(a)(1).
105. Id. § 4-90-404(a)(2), (b)(1). The required disclosure to be utilized by the
manufacturer is in the form of a booklet prepared by the Office of the Attorney
General. Id. § 4-90-404(b)(2). The booklet, A Consumer's Guide to the Arkansas
New Motor Vehicle Quality Assurance Act, must be provided at the time of purchase
or lease of every new vehicle covered by the lemon law. Id. § 4-90-404(b)(1).
106. Id. § 4-90-404(a)(2).
107. Id. § 4-90-414(a)(1).
108. Id. § 4-90-414(b)(1) (incorporating 16 C.F.R. §§ 703.i-.8 (1993)).
109. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-414(a)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993).
110. Id. § 4-90-414(a)(1). The informal dispute procedure must be certified by
the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of Attorney General as meeting
lemon law requirements. Id. § 4-90-414(b).
111. As of the date of this writing, two manufacturers operate their own programs.
Ford Motor Company has established the Dispute Settlement Board as its program.
Similarly, Chrysler Corporation has established the Customer Arbitration Board.
Porsche and Subaru are participating in the Autosolve program operated by the
American Automobile Association. General Motors and other manufacturers are
participating in the Autoline program operated by the Council of Better Business
Bureaus, Inc.
112. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-414(a)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993). General Motors
waived the requirement in their 1993 manuals. However, the waiver does not exist
in the 1994 manuals.
113. Id. § 4-90-414(b)(6).
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The actual format of the hearing process permits the consumer
or his attorney"14 to be present at the hearing and to make an oral
presentation." 5 It also allows the consumer to have an independent
expert of his own choosing at the hearing to contest any assertion
by the manufacturer that the vehicle conforms to specifications."
6
Also with respect to the hearing format, the lemon law provides
the consumer the option of either a one-member panel or a three-
member panel to hear his case." 7 The actual selection of the members
of the panel is governed by Magnuson-Moss guidelines, 1 8 and those
members, who are approved by the Attorney General," 9 are preselected
by the informal dispute resolution program. The decision reached
by the panel is binding on the manufacturer but not on the consumer. '20
In addition, the manufacturer has no avenue to appeal the decision.
It is important to realize that when proceeding either through
the informal process or through court action, the presumptions of
"reasonable opportunity to repair" are rebuttable. 12 Thus, the burden
is shifted to the manufacturer to show that it did not have a
reasonable opportunity to repair the defect. In addition, the
manufacturer also has available certain affirmative defenses, 122 one
of which is that the nonconformity does not substantially impair
the use, value, or safety of the motor vehicle. 23 When asserting or
contesting the substantial impairment defense, the case law in Arkansas
regarding nonconformities and revocation of acceptance will most
114. Id. § 4-90-414(b)(7).
115. Id. § 4-90-414(b)(4)(A). The lemon law, while allowing attorney's fees to
be recovered on successful court action, has no specific provision for the reim-
bursement of attorney's fees if the consumer is successful in pursuing a claim
through the informal dispute resolution process.
116. Id. § 4-90-414(b)(5). However, the consumer is required to bear the costs
for his own expert. Id. In addition to the consumer's technical expert, if the
members of the informal dispute resolution procedure feel that they need an
independent investigator of their own, the lemon law requires that this investigator
be selected from a pool of at least four persons who are appointed annually by
the informal dispute resolution program. Id. § 4-90-414(c)(1)(C). These appointments
must be approved by the Attorney General. Id.
117. Id. § 4-90-414(c)(1)(B).
118. Id. § 4-90-414(b)(1). A panel member must be a person who is interested
in fair and expeditious settlements of disputes and cannot be a party to the dispute
nor an employee or agent of any party except for purposes of deciding the dispute.
16 C.F.R. § 703.4 (1993).
119. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-414(c)(1)(A) (Michie Supp. 1993).
120. Id. § 4-90-415.
121. Id. § 4-90-410(a).
122. Id. § 4-90-413.
123. Id. § 4-90-413(1).
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likely come into analysis. The question of substantial impairment is
a question of fact, and when asserting this affirmative defense, the
burden is on the manufacturer to show the absence of substantial
impairment.
If a consumer is not satisfied with the results of the informal
dispute resolution process, he can proceed with his claim in court.124
However, the decision reached in the informal process will be
admissible as evidence in the civil action. 25 Another concern regarding
civil court action is that the statute of limitations under the lemon
law is shorter than the U.C.C.'s period of four years. 26 Under the
lemon law, the suit must be brought within two years of the date
of first reporting the nonconformity 27 or, if the informal process
has been used, two years following initiation of an action through
the informal dispute process.
2
In addition to a consumer's suit for damages, court ordered
enforcement under the lemon law is available to the Attorney General.
Violations of the provisions of the lemon law, such as the failure
of a manufacturer to operate or participate in an informal dispute
resolution program or failure to provide the required disclosures to
consumers, are defined as per se violations of the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act. 29 While Arkansas law is not totally clear, it appears
that in addition to state enforcement, private remedies under the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act may also available. 30
124. Id. § 4-90-415(a).
125. 16 C.F.R. § 703.50) as incorporated by ARI. CODE ANN. § 4-90-414(b)(1)
(Michie Supp. 1993).
126. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-725(1) (Michie 1991). The U.C.C. statute of lim-
itations begins to run when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's
lack of knowledge of the breach. Id.
127. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-416(a) (Michie Supp. 1993).
128. Id. § 4-90-416(b).
129. Id. § 4-90-417. The Deceptive Trade Practices Act is codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-88-101 to -207 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1993). The Attorney General may
seek injunctive relief, restitution for consumers, and civil penalties. Id. § 4-88-113.
130. There is little case law in Arkansas on the issue of whether there are private
enforcement rights under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. However, the supreme
court has strongly hinted in dicta that sound authority exists for the proposition
that statutes designed to protect the public from deceptive marketing and advertising
practices imply a right of enforcement by civil action by persons injured by their
breach. See Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 397, 653
S.W.2d 128, 134 (1983) (finding that violation of consumer protection statute may
be used as evidence of negligence in tort action). Even more indicative that a
private cause of action exists under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is a 1993
amendment adding provisions for enhanced penalties when elderly or disabled persons
are victimized. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-201 (Michie Supp. 1993). The enhanced
penalties amendment provides a private enforcement remedy for elderly or disabled




To revisit the earlier example of Mary and her purchase of a
defective automobile,'' she may wish to pursue the matter through
the lemon law process. Let us assume that she has taken her car
back to the dealer for repairs, and after three attempts to repair,
32
the problem with the vehicle continues to exist. Her next step would
be to send a letter to the manufacturer, via certified mail, affording
it one last chance to repair her car.'
3
The manufacturer may or may not respond to this letter. Mary
should receive a notice providing a time and place for the final
repair opportunity by the manufacturer. However, sometimes the
manufacturer does not respond at all. If no response is received by
Mary, or if the vehicle is not repaired in a timely fashion 34 after
she has notified the manufacturer of its last opportunity to repair,
Mary has established her presumption of owning a lemon.'35 She
should then demand either a refund or replacement vehicle. In actual
practice, this demand is advanced by proceeding into arbitration
through the informal dispute process.
Hopefully, the process will be as effective for Mary as it has
been for other consumers, as indicated in preliminary reports. Of
the five initial cases heard by the Better Business Bureau 36 on behalf
of the manufacturers they represent, only one case resulted in failure
to award a refund of the purchase price. In that case, the existence
of the defect could not be found.3 7 If these early reports are
131. See supra p. 495.
132. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-406 (Michie Supp. 1993) (providing other
methods in which defects may give rise to "lemon" status).
133. Not all presumptions giving rise to lemon status require giving the man-
ufacturer a final attempt to repair. Id. § 4-90-410(a)(2), (3).
134. Within ten days after receipt of the notification by the consumer, the
manufacturer is required to notify and provide the consumer with an opportunity
to have the vehicle repaired at a reasonably accessible repair facility. Id. § 4-90-
406(a)(2). After the consumer delivers the vehicle to the designated repair facility,
the manufacturer has ten days to conform the vehicle to the warranty. Id. If the
manufacturer fails to notify and provide the consumer with the opportunity to
have the vehicle repaired at a reasonably accessible repair facility or fails to perform
the repairs within the allotted time periods, then the manufacturer is not entitled
to a final attempt to cure the nonconformity. Id. § 4-90-406(a)(3).
135. It is assumed for purposes of this example that the defect substantially
impairs the use, value, or safety of her vehicle. See id. § 4-90-403(13).
136. Letter from Alan L. Cohen, Senior Attorney, Council of Better Business
Bureaus, Inc., to Clifford P. Block, Investigator, Consumer Protection Division,




representative of future benefits, the results of the Arkansas lemon
law look promising to Mary and others like her. 3'
However, if Mary is not satisfied with the results from the
informal process, she then has the option of bringing a civil action. a9
In addition, she should not limit her claim to lemon law relief but
should include other remedies available to her, such as actions of
breach of warranty and revocation of acceptance.' 4° However, if she
should prevail on more than one of the causes of action, it is
imperative that calculation of damages be based upon the proper
election of remedies since Mary cannot receive double or triple
recovery.'1
4
Often the manufacturer may resolve the matter prior to arbi-
tration by repurchasing the vehicle when it is apparent that the
consumer will have a successful case. Whether repurchased as a
result of voluntary agreement, arbitration, or court judgment, the
nonconforming vehicle may not be resold in Arkansas unless the
manufacturer provides a minimum express warranty. 142 Further, the
manufacturer must provide a written disclosure to the subsequent
buyer that the vehicle was repurchased as a nonconforming vehicle.1
43
The Arkansas lemon law contains new procedures and standards
that will undoubtedly be subjected to clarification through future
judicial analysis. Certain aspects may be examined in relation to
existing legal doctrine in Arkansas, and, while lemon laws of the
other states vary greatly, there is a developing base of case law in
other jurisdictions that may prove to be helpful when interpreting
provisions of Arkansas law that are similar to those of other states.
In conclusion, it appears that the Arkansas New Motor Vehicle
138. The 1992 lemon law awards in Texas reflect that 15% of the formal
complaints filed were awarded relief of either repurchase or replacement. However,
other complaints may have been resolved through the informal complaint process.
TEXAS DEP'T OF TRANs., MOTOR VEHICLE LEMON LAW ANNUAL REPORT (1992).
Similarly, Florida's results for 1992 reflect that 20.4% of complaints filed resulted
in refunds or replacement vehicles. FLORIDA LEMON LAW ARBITRATION PROGRAM,
ANNUAL REPORT (1992).
139. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-415(a) (Michie Supp. 1993).
140. The lemon law does not limit other remedies available to a consumer. Id.
§ 4-90-415(b).
141. Thomas Auto Co. v. Craft, 297 Ark. 492, 497-98, 763 S.W.2d 651, 654
(1989).
142. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-412(1) (Michie Supp. 1993). A minimum warranty
must be provided with coverage at least equal to the original express warrahty on
the vehicle for a period of twelve months or twelve thousand miles, whichever
expires first. Id.
143. Id. § 4-90-412(2).
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Quality Assurance Act is a branch of hope for consumers who have
unknowingly picked a"lemon."
Clifford P. Block

